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Software Verification for Weak Memory via Program
Transformation⋆
Jade Alglave, Daniel Kroening, Vincent Nimal, and Michael Tautschnig
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK
Abstract Despite multiprocessors implementing weak memory models, verific-
ation methods often assume Sequential Consistency (SC), thus may miss bugs due
to weak memory. We propose a sound transformation of the program to verify,
enabling SC tools to perform verification w.r.t. weak memory. We present exper-
iments for a broad variety of models (from x86/TSO to Power/ARM) and a vast
range of verification tools, quantify the additional cost of the transformation and
highlight the cases when we can drastically reduce it. Our benchmarks include
work-queue management code from PostgreSQL.
1 Introduction
Current multi-core architectures such as Intel’s x86, IBM’s Power or ARM, implement
weak memory models for performance reasons, allowing optimisations such as instruc-
tion reordering, store buffering or write atomicity relaxation [3]. These models make
concurrent programming and debugging extremely challenging, because the execution
of a concurrent program might not be an interleaving of its instructions, as would be the
case on a Sequentially Consistent (SC) architecture [20]. As an instance, the lock-free
signalling code in the open-source database PostgreSQL failed on regression tests on a
PowerPC cluster, due to the memory model. We study this bug in detail in Sec. 5.
This observation highlights the crucial need for weak memory aware verification.
Yet, most existing work assume SC [27], hence might miss bugs specific to weak
memory. Recent work addresses the design or the adaptation of existing methods and
tools to weak memory [25,31,15,9,23,8,2], but often focuses on one specific model or
cannot handle the write atomicity relaxation of Power/ARM: generality remains a chal-
lenge.
Since we want to avoid writing one tool per architecture of interest, we propose a
unified method. Given a program analyser handling SC concurrency for C programs, we
transform its input to simulate the possible non-SC behaviours of the program whilst
executing the program on SC. Essentially, we augment our programs with arrays to
simulate (on SC) the buffering and caching scenarios due to weak memory.
The verification problem for weak memory models is known to be hard (e.g. non-
primitive recursive for TSO), if not undecidable (e.g. for RMO-like models) [6]. In
practice, this means that we cannot design a complete verification method. Yet, we can
⋆ Supported by EPSRC project EP/G026254/1 and the Semiconductor Research Coropration
(SRC) under task 2269.002.
achieve soundness, by implementing our tools in tandem with the design of a proof, and
by stressing our tools with test cases reflecting subtle points of the proof.
We also aim for an effective and unified verification setup, where one can easily plug
a tool of choice. This paper meets these objectives by making three new contributions:
1. Sec. 3 details our transformation for concurrent programs on weak memory. This
requires defining a generic abstract machine that we prove (in the Coq proof assist-
ant) equivalent to the framework of [5] (recalled in Sec. 2). Sec. 3 shows a drastic
optimisation of the transformation, and we prove that this is sound.
2. Sec. 4 describes our implementation, where the generality of our approach re-
veals itself the most: we support a broad variety of models (x86/TSO, PSO, RMO
and Power) and program analysers (Blender [18], CheckFence [9], ESBMC [11],
MMChecker [15], Poirot [1], SatAbs [13], Threader [14], and our new CImpact
tool, an extension of Impact [22] to SC concurrency).
3. Sec. 5 details our experiments using this setup. i) We systematically validate our
implementation w.r.t. our theoretical study with 555 litmus tests, generated by the
diy tool [5] to exercise weak memory artefacts in isolation. ii) We verify several
TSO examples from the literature [12,26,19,30,10]. iii) We verify a new example,
which is an excerpt of the relational database software PostgreSQL and has a bug
specific to Power. This bug raised notable interest at IBM, and we are already trying
our tools on their software.
We provide the source and documentation of our tools, our benchmarks, Coq proofs
and experimental reports online: www.cs.ox.ac.uk/people/vincent.nimal/instrument/
Related Work We focus here on the verification problem, i.e. forbidding the behaviours
that are buggy, not all the non-SC ones. This problem is non-primitive recursive for
TSO [6]. It is undecidable if the reads are smart (i.e. they can guess the value that they
will read eventually), e.g. for RMO-like models [6]. Forbidding causal loops restores
decidability; relaxing write atomicity makes the problem undecidable again [7].
Previous work therefore compromise by choosing various bounds over the objects
of the model [8,17], over-approximating the possible behaviours [18,16], or relinquish-
ing termination [21]. For TSO, [2] presents a sound and complete solution.
By contrast, we disregard in the present paper any completeness issue. We are not
primarily concerned with efficiency either, although we do provide a drastic optimisa-
tion of our transformation. focus in this work on the soundness, generality, and imple-
mentability of our method, to bridge the gap between theory and practice. We emphasise
the fact that our method allows to lift any SC method or tool to a large spectrum of weak
memory models, ranging from x86 to Power.
2 Context: Axiomatic Model
We use the framework of [5], which provably embraces several architectures: SC [20],
Sun TSO (i.e. the x86 model [24]), PSO and RMO, Alpha, and a fragment of Power.
We present this framework via litmus tests, as shown in Fig. 1.
sb
P0 P1
(a)x← 1 (c)y← 1
(b)r1← y (d)r2← x
Allowed? r1=0; r2=0
(a)Wx1
(b)Ry0
(c)Wy1
(d)Rx0
po
fr
po
fr
Figure 1. Store Buffering (sb)
iriw
P0 P1 P2 P3
(a)r1← x (c)r3← y (e)x← 1 (f)y← 1
(b)r2← y (d)r4← x
Allowed? r1=1; r2=0; r3=1; r4=0;
(a)Rx1
(b)Ry0
(c)Ry1
(d)Rx0
(e)Wx1 (f)Wy1
po po
rf
fr
rf
fr
Figure 2. Independent Reads of Independent Writes (iriw)
The keyword allowed asks if a given architecture allows the outcome “r1=0;r2=0”.
This relates to the execution graphs of this program, composed of relations over read
and write memory events. A store instruction (e.g. x← 1 on P0) corresponds to a write
event ((a)Wx1), and a load (e.g. r1← y on P0) to a read ((b)Ry0). The validity of an
execution boils down to the absence of certain cycles in the execution graph. Indeed, an
architecture allows an execution when it represents a consensus amongst the processors.
A cycle in an execution graph is a potential violation of this consensus.
If an execution graph has a cycle, we check if the architecture relaxes some relations
in this cycle. The consensus can ignore a relaxed relation, hence become acyclic, i.e.
the architecture allows the final state. In Fig. 1, on SC where no relation is relaxed, the
cycle forbids the execution. x86 relaxes the program order (po in Fig. 1) between writes
and reads, thus a forbidding cycle no longer exists since (a, b) and (c, d) are relaxed.
Executions Formally, an event is a read or a write memory access, composed of a
unique identifier, a direction R for read or W for write, a memory address, and a value.
We represent each instruction by the events it issues. In Fig. 2, we associate the store
x← 1 on processor P2 to the event (e)Wx1.
We associate the program with an event structure E , (E, po), composed of its
events E and the program order po, a per-processor total order. We write dp for the
relation (included in po, the source being a read) modelling dependencies between in-
structions, e.g. an address dependency occurs when computing the address of a load or
store from the value of a preceding load.
Then, we represent the communication between processors leading to the final state
via an execution witness X , (ws, rf), which consists of two relations over the events.
First, the write serialisation ws is a per-address total order on writes which models
the memory coherence widely assumed by modern architectures . It links a write w to
any write w′ to the same address that hits the memory after w. Second, the read-from
relation rf links a write w to a read r such that r reads the value written by w.
We include the writes in the consensus via the write serialisation. Unfortunately, the
read-from map does not give us enough information to embed the reads as well. To that
aim, we derive the from-read relation fr from ws and rf. A read r is in fr with a write w
when the write w′ from which r reads hit the memory before w did. Formally, we have:
(r, w) ∈ fr , ∃w′, (w′, r) ∈ rf ∧ (w′, w) ∈ ws.
In Fig. 2, the specified outcome corresponds to the execution on the right if each
memory location and register initially holds 0. If r1=1 in the end, the read (a) read
its value from the write (e) on P2, hence (e, a) ∈ rf. If r2=0 in the end, the read (b)
read its value from the initial state, thus before the write (f) on P3, hence (b, f) ∈ fr.
Similarly, we have (f, c) ∈ rf from r3=1, and (d, e) ∈ fr from r4=0.
Relaxed or safe A processor can commit a write w first to a store buffer, then to a cache,
and finally to memory. When a write hits the memory, all the processors agree on its
value. But when the write w transits in store buffers and caches, a processor can read its
value through a read r before the value is actually available to all processors from the
memory. In this case, the read-from relation between the write w and the read r does
not contribute to the consensus, since the reading occurs in advance.
We model this by some subrelation of the read-from rf being relaxed, i.e. not in-
cluded in the consensus. When a processor can read from its own store buffer [3] (the
typical TSO/x86 scenario), we relax the internal read-from rfi. When two processors P0
and P1 can communicate privately via a cache (a case of write atomicity relaxation [3]),
we relax the external read-from rfe, and call the corresponding write non-atomic. This
is the main particularity of Power or ARM, and cannot happen on TSO/x86.
Some program-order pairs may be relaxed (e.g. write-read pairs on x86, and all but
dp ones on Power), i.e. only a subset of po is guaranteed to occur in this order. Ar-
chitectures provide special fence (or barrier) instructions, to prevent weak behaviours.
Following [5], the relation fence ⊆ po induced by a fence is non-cumulative when
it orders certain pairs of events surrounding the fence, i.e. fence is safe. The relation
fence is cumulative when it makes writes atomic, e.g. by flushing caches. The relation
fence is A-cumulative (resp. B-cumulative) if rfe; fence (resp. fence; rfe) is safe. When
stores are atomic (i.e. rfe is safe), e.g. on TSO, we do not need cumulativity.
Architectures An architecture A determines the set safeA of the relations safe on A,
i.e. the relations embedded in the consensus. Following [5], we consider the write seri-
alisation ws and the from-read relation fr to be always safe, i.e. not relaxed. SC relaxes
nothing, i.e. rf and po are safe. TSO authorises the reordering of write-read pairs and
store buffering (i.e. poWR and rfi are relaxed) but nothing else.
Finally, an execution (E,X) is valid on Awhen the three following conditions hold.
1. SC holds per address, i.e. the communication and the program order for accesses with
same address po-loc are compatible: uniproc(E,X) , acyclic(ws ∪ rf ∪ fr ∪ po-loc).
2. Values do not come out of thin air, i.e. there is no causal loop: thin(E,X) ,
acyclic(rf ∪ dp). 3. There is a consensus, i.e. the safe relations do not form a cycle:
consensus(E,X) , acyclic((ws ∪ rf ∪ fr ∪ po) ∩ safeA). Formally:
validA(E,X) , uniproc(E,X) ∧ thin(E,X) ∧ consensus(E,X)
3 Simulating Weak Behaviours on SC
We want to transform a program P into a program P ′ so that executing P ′ on SC
gives us the behaviours that P exhibits on a weak architecture. To do so, we define
an abstract machine, composed of a store buffer per address and a load queue. We
avoid defining one machine per architecture as follows. We first define a core machine,
implementing the uniproc and thin checks common to all models. Then, we implement
an architecture A by adding, on top of the core, a protocol ordering the entering and
exiting the buffers and queue. This protocol enforces the consensus order defined by A.
3.1 The Abstract Machine
A state s is either ⊥ or a tuple (m, b, q, l), which contains (writing addr, evt, proc, rln
for the types of memory addresses, events, processors (or thread ids) and relations):
the memory m : addr→ evt maps a memory address ℓ to a write to ℓ;
a buffer b : addr→ rln evt a total order over writes to the same address;
a queue q : rln (evt × evt) over reads, tracking instruction dependencies;
the log l : proc× addr→ evt provides the last write to address ℓ seen by thread p.
Note that our buffer is not a per-thread object, but solely a per-location object, as
opposed to most existing formalisations. This allows us to model not only store buffer-
ing (which per-thread objects would allow), but also caching scenarios as exhibited by
iriw+dps (i.e. the iriw test of Fig. 2 with dependencies between the reads on P0 and P1
to prevent their reordering), i.e. fully non-atomic stores.
Core machine We modify a state via labels. Given an execution (E,X), we define our
labels from the events of E. First, we augment our events: a write w becomes w(w) and
r becomes r(w, r), where w is the write from which r reads (i.e. (w, r) ∈ rf). Then we
tag an augmented event e to build the labels d(e) and f(e). In effect, we split an event e
into its delayed part d(e) (the part entering the buffer or the queue), and its flushed part
f(e) (the part exiting the buffer or the queue).
A label modifies a state s = (m, b, q, l) as follows. We describe the transitions in
prose, and omit their formal definitions for brevity (our Coq proofs are available online):
Write to buffer a write d(w(w)) to location ℓ can always enter the buffer b, taking its
place after all the writes to ℓ that are already in b;
Write from buffer to memory a write f(w(w)) to location ℓ and from thread p exits
the buffer b and updates the memory to ℓ if there is no write to ℓ pending in b, and
if there is no pending read from ℓ enqueued by p before w entered b;
Enqueue read a read d(r(w, r)) can always enter the queue q, taking its place after all
the reads in q on which r depends (i.e. {r′ | (r′, r) ∈ dp ∨ (r′, w) ∈ dp));
Read from queue a read f(r(w, r)) by thread p from ℓ exits the queue and updates the
log relative to p and ℓ if there is no pending read on which r depends; if no write to
ℓ and from p entered the buffer b after (resp. before) r yet took its place in b before
(resp. after) w; and if w took its place in b after the last write to ℓ seen by p.
The rules for writes enforce the existence of a write serialisation, since we order the
writes to a given location in the buffer, then flush them in the same order. Reads are
smart (to the extent that they respect uniproc or thin): we flush a read f(r(w, r)) if the
write w lies in the memory or in the buffer, i.e. in any level of the memory hierarchy.
Finally, note that the core machine implements the uniproc and thin checks that all
architectures satisfy, thanks to the premises to exiting the buffer or the queue.
Consensus protocol Now, to implement a particular architecture A, the machine also
needs to implement the consensus defined by A. We do so by defining a protocol that
constrains the order in which reads and writes exit the queue and the buffer, as follows.
We first gather the delay pairs of A (adapting the terminology of [29,4]). The delays
make a program behave differently on A than on SC, as follows [5,4]. First, when the
program has a relaxed program order pair, e.g. (a, b) in Fig. 1 on TSO. Second, when
the program reads from a non-atomic write, e.g. (e, a) in Fig. 2 on Power. Formally:
delaysA(E,X) , {(e, e
′) ∈ (po ∪ rfe) ∧ (e, e′) 6∈ safeA}
Note that there is no delay on SC, and that the rfe case only concerns architectures
relaxing write atomicity, e.g. Power/ARM, but not x86. In practice, the delays are: the
write-read pairs on x86/TSO, e.g. in Fig. 1 (a, b) and (c, d); the write-read and write-
write pairs on PSO; all po pairs (except dp ones) on RMO and Power; all rfe pairs, on
Power, e.g. in Fig. 2 (e, a) and (f, c).
In the following, e stands for both the event e and its augmented event. To implement
the consensus order defined by a given architecture A, we augment our core machine
with an A-protocol. Formally, we feed it a path of labels path(E,X,D) defined as
follows (where D is a set of pairs to be delayed):
Enter in po we ensure that our machine has an SC semantics, by forcing two events
e1 and e2 in program order to enter the buffer and the queue in this order; i.e.
(e1, e2) ∈ po ⇒ (d(e1), d(e2)) ∈ path(E,X,D);
Safe exit (se) if (e1, e2) does not form a delay, we force them to exit the buffer and
the queue in the same order i.e. (e1, e2) 6∈ D⇒ (f(e1), f(e2)) ∈ path(E,X,D);
Delayed exit (de) if (e1, e2) forms a delay, we force them to exit the buffer and the
queue in the converse order i.e. (e1, e2) ∈ D⇒ (f(e2), f(e1)) ∈ path(E,X,D).
Observe that if there are no delay pairs (i.e. D = ∅), this definition describes all
possible interleavings, i.e. our machine implements SC:
Lemma 1. validSC(E,X)⇔ mns(E, path(E,X, ∅))
Examples We illustrate how the machine implements TSO or Power by revisiting the
sb test of Fig. 1 for TSO and the iriw test of Fig. 2 for Power.
In Fig. 1, the pairs (a, b) on P0 and (c, d) on P1 are delays on TSO. Our machine
simulates the weak behaviour exhibited on TSO, following the scenario in Fig. 3. The
machine buffers or enqueues all events w.r.t. program order. Since (a, b) and (c, d) are
delays on TSO, the machine augmented with a TSO protocol flushes the reads b and d
before the writes a and c, ensuring that the registers r1 and r2 hold 0 in the end.
(a)Wx1
(b)Ry0
(c)Wy1
(d)Rx0
po
fr
po
fr
(a) Axiomatic model
d(a)
f(a)
d(b)
f(b)
d(c)
f(c)
d(d)
f(d)
po
de
se
po
de
se
(b) Machine model
Figure 3. Revisiting sb with our core machine augmented with a TSO protocol
(a)Rx1
(b)Ry0
(c)Ry1
(d)Rx0
(e)Wx1 (f)Wy1
dp dp
rf
fr
rf
fr
(a) Axiomatic model
d(a)
f(a)
d(b)
f(b)
d(c)
f(c)
d(d)
f(d)
d(e)
f(e)
d(f)
f(f)
dp
se
se
dp
se
de
se
de
(b) Machine model
Figure 4. Revisiting iriw+dps with our core machine augmented with a Power protocol
In Fig. 2, assume dependencies between the reads on P0 and P1, so that (a, b)
on P0 and (c, d) on P1 are safe on Power. Yet (e, a) and (f, c) are delays, because
Power has non-atomic writes. Our machine simulates the weak behaviour exhibited on
Power, following Fig. 4. The machine enqueues or buffers all events w.r.t. program
order. Since (a, b) and (c, d) are safe on Power, our machine augmented with a Power
protocol flushes a before b (resp. c before d). The writes corresponding to a and c are
in the buffer, ensuring that r1 and r3 hold the value 1 in the end. Since (b, f) ∈ fr
(resp. (d, e) ∈ fr), which is always safe, the machine flushes b before f (resp. d before
e), ensuring that b and d read from memory, thus r2 and r4 hold 0 in the end. Finally,
since (e, a) and (f, c) are delays, the machine flushes them in the converse order.
Formally, we establish the equivalence of the axiomatic definition of A (cf. Sec. 2)
with our machine augmented with an A-protocol. We write mns for machine not stuck,
i.e. the machine cannot relate any state to ⊥ when reading a given path of labels:
Thm. 1. validA(E,X)∧¬(validSC(E,X))⇔ mns(E, path(E,X, delaysA(E,X)))
Thm. 1 shows that our machine provides a hierarchy of weak memory models equi-
valent to the one of [5], but in an operational style rather than an axiomatic one.
Let us explain what intuitively matters for Thm. 1 to hold, or in other words for us
to be able to simulate a weak execution in an SC world. A weak execution will contain
at least one cycle that contradicts the definition of SC, e.g. in Fig. 1 and 2. Such a cycle
contradicts SC in that it violates program order: for example in Fig. 1, the pair (a, b) on
P0 is in po, but there is also a path from b to a.
To enable SC reasoning, we need to dismantle the cycle, as illustrated in Fig. 3
and Fig. 4. These figures recall on the left the axiomatic cycles of Fig. 1 and 2. On the
right, they show the machine counterparts of the axiomatic cycles. We use the following
graphical conventions. In the axiomatic world (i.e. on the left of our figures), we reflect
a delay pair by a dashed arrow. For example in the sb test of Fig. 3 on TSO, the write-
read pairs (a, b) and (d, c) are delayed. In the iriw+dps test of Fig. 4 on Power, the
read-from pairs (e, a) and (f, c) are delayed (as opposed to the read-read pairs (a, b) on
P0 and (c, d) on P1, which are safe thanks to the dependencies). In the machine world,
the Delayed exit rule (i.e. the machine counterpart of delayed pairs) is depicted with
a dashed arrow. For safe pairs and the safe exit rule (the machine counterpart of safe
pairs), we use thick arrows, e.g. the dependency dp between a and b on P0 in iriw+dps.
First, we dismantle the axiomatic cycle by splitting an event into its delay and flush
parts, e.g. the write a on P0 in sb becomes d(a) and f(a). Then, we enable SC reasoning
by enforcing consistency with the program order. For example in Fig. 3, the pair (a, b)
is in po on the left, which we reflect on the right by pushing d(a) and d(b) in the buffer
and the queue in this order, as depicted by the po arrow.
Then, the Delayed exit rule de allows us to create a diversion from the cycle: we
flush first f(b) then f(a) as depicted by the de arrow between f(b) and f(a) on the right.
Similarly for the iriw+dps example recalled on the left of Fig. 4, we split all events
into their d and f parts, then create a diversion from the axiomatic cycle by using the
Delayed exit rule on e.g. the (e, a) pair, as depicted by the de arrow between f(a) and
f(e) on the right. This means that we flush the read f(a) before the write f(e), hence the
read a occurs from the queue, i.e. a reads the value of e from the buffer.
3.2 Reducing the Number of Delay Pairs
Crucially, the notion of creating a diversion from an SC cycle allows us to optimise
the number of pairs that we delay. Lem. 1 shows that when (E,X) is SC (despite the
program being run on a weak architecture A), no pair needs delaying.
Critical delays Consider (E,X) valid on A but not on SC, as in Fig. 1. The pairs (a, b)
and (c, d) are delays on TSO, i.e. both might be delayed. But it suffices to delay one of
them to reveal the weak behaviour. Indeed, it is sufficient to buffer e.g. the write (a) to
x on P0, perform all the other events from memory (thus r1 = 0 and r2 = 0 because
the write (a) lies in the buffer), and finally flush the write (a) to memory.
In the non-SC execution of Fig. 2, (e, a), (f, c) are delays on Power (assuming
dependencies to make (a, b) and (c, d) safe), but it suffices to delay e.g. (e, a). We
buffer the write (e), enqueue the read (a), and perform other events from memory. This
corresponds to a caching scenario where P0 and P3 communicate privately via x (since
they communicate from the buffer to the queue), all the other communications occurring
from memory, in an SC fashion.
Note that in both cases, the reasoning would have been similar if we had chosen
another delay pair along the cycle exhibited by the execution, or if we had delayed more
events than just the ones we chose. As said before, what matters is to delay enough pairs
to form a diversion from the cycle, to enable an SC reasoning.
We said before that when an execution is SC, no pair needs delaying. [4, Thm.1]
characterises the non-SC executions by the presence of certain cycles, called critical
cycles, which satisfy the two following conditions. (i) Per processor, the cycle involves
at most two memory accesses a and b on this processor and addr(a) 6= addr(b). (ii) For
a given memory location x, the cycle involves at most three accesses relative to x, and
these accesses are from distinct processors. The executions of the tests sb and iriw in
Fig. 1 and 2 give typical examples of critical cycles.
Thus, if there is a weak memory specific bug in an execution, it is along a critical
cycle, or on the remainder of a path after a critical cycle. Formally, we show that we
only need to delay (i.e. apply the Delayed exit rule de) one delay pair per critical cycle
to simulate a weak execution with our machine (writing critsA(E,X) for any selection
of pairs in delays
A
(E,X) with at least one pair per critical cycle of E):
Thm. 2. (validA(E,X)∧ ¬(validSC(E,X)))⇔ mns(E, path(E,X, critsA(E,X)))
Thm. 2 has several consequences. From the semantic perspective, it defines a family
of paths equivalent to (E,X), i.e. the paths built inductively as above from any selection
of critical pairs. Thus one can see the partial orders given by (E,X) in the axiomatic
model as the canonical representation of all the equivalent operational paths.
From the verification perspective, the critical pairs highlight the instructions that
should be delayed when verifying a program running on weak memory. Crucially, we
show that only one delay pair per critical cycle actually needs delaying. This enables
efficient verification, as shown by our experiments (cf. in Sec. 5 the time taken by
SatAbs to verify the two versions of the PostgreSQL excerpt: 21.34 vs. 1.29 seconds).
Transformation Consider a non-SC execution and a selection of delays, e.g. the execu-
tion of sb in Fig. 3 and the pair (a, b). As said before, we only need to create a diversion
from the cycle, here by using the Delay exit rule de on (a, b), i.e. flushing f(b) then
f(a) as depicted on the right of Fig. 3. Consider now that the other pairs, in our example
(c, d), are not delayed, in the sense that we use the Safe exit rule to handle them; this
amounts to having an se arrow between f(c) and f(d). This scenario corresponds to a
situation where the write c writes directly to memory (i.e. in our machine writes to the
buffer but is flushed immediately after), and the read d reads from memory as well.
Thus in practice, we will tag an event with m to mean that we perform it w.r.t. memory.
Otherwise, given a selection D of delays, we delay an event e (i.e. tag it d) when:
Source of program order (dpo) there is an event e′ after e in program order (i.e. (e, e′) ∈
po), forming a delay pair with e (i.e. (e, e′) ∈ D); or
Source of read-from (drfs) there is a read e′ from another thread reading from e (i.e.
(e, e′) ∈ rfe), forming a delay pair with e (i.e. (e, e′) ∈ D); or
Target of read-from (drft) there is a write e′ from another thread from which e reads
(i.e. (e′, e) ∈ rfe), forming a delay pair with e (i.e. (e′, e) ∈ D).
Thus, we simulate a non-SC execution on an architecture A as follows: 1. We find
the critical cycles. 2. We select at least one delay pair per critical cycle. 3. We tag the
events in these pairs with d w.r.t. (dpo), (drfs) and (drft), and all the others with m.
4. We perform the events tagged d from the buffer or the queue, and the events tagged
m from memory. 5. We flush the delay pairs following the Delayed exit rule de, and the
other pairs following the Safe exit rule se.
1 thd1: thd2: thd3: thd4:
2 r1:=x r3:=y x:=1 y:=1
3 tmp1:=x xor x tmp2:=y xor y
4 r2:=y+tmp1 r4:=x+tmp2
6 main:
7 thd1() || thd2() || thd3() || thd4()
8 assert (!( r1=1 & r2=0 & r3=1 & r4=0))
(a)Rx
(b)Ry
(c)Ry
(d)Rx
(e)Wx (f)Wy
dp dp
1 thd1: thd3: main:
2 // was r1:=x // was x:=1 [...]
3 if (∗) if (∗) // was assert
4 r1:= buff x . take (thd1) buff x .push(1,thd3) if (!( delay r1=0) & ∗)
5 else else r1:=deref ( delay r1 )
6 delay r1 := ref (x) end x:=1 end delay r1 :=0 end
7 [...] // same for delay r2
8 assert (!( r1=1 & r2=0
9 // same for thd2 // same for thd4 & r3=1 & r4=0))
Figure 5. Study of transformation of iriw+dps
4 Implementation
We implemented the transformation technique described above. Our tool reads a con-
current C program, and generates a new concurrent C program augmented with buffers
and queues, which is then passed to an SC verification tool. We added two memory
fences (fence and lwfence) as new C keywords to support x86’s mfence and
Power’s sync and lwsync with the semantics presented in Sec. 2.
We first translate the C source code into a goto-program (a control flow graph),
then feed it to goto-instrument (a tool automating transformations of goto-programs).
We have extended goto-instrument with the transformation described in Sec. 3: given a
memory model (x86/TSO, PSO, RMO and Power are available for now), goto-instrument
adds the instructions necessary to transform the delay pairs.
Let us explain how we transform a program using the example iriw+dps (a variation
of the iriw test of Fig. 2, augmented with dependencies between the read pairs to make
these pairs safe). We give this program (in C) at the top of Fig. 5.
To transform iriw+dps, goto-instrument first produces the abstract event graph
on the right-hand side of Fig. 5 from the control-flow graph of the program, which
over-approximates the event structures by ignoring the values of the variables, and each
abstract event may correspond to an unbounded number of concrete events. The tool
then computes possible critical cycles on abstract events. By taking into account any
possible concretisation of these events, these cycles are an over-approximation of the
actual cycles present in concrete executions of this program, but spurious cycles do not
impair the soundness of our method. On our example, due to the direction of dp arrows,
the only possible cycle corresponds to the one in Fig. 2: a, b, f, c, d, e, a.
Next, goto-instrument computes the delay pairs for the selected memory model
(here, for Power, (e, a), and (f, c)). Following Sec. 3.2, we can transform all the delay
pairs (following Thm. 1), or only one pair per cycle (following Thm. 2). As we discuss
in Sec. 5, this choice can have a drastic impact on the time required by the program
analyser (e.g. 21.34 vs. 1.29 seconds for SatAbs on the PostgreSQL excerpt).
The tool then transforms these pairs (underlined instructions and events in Fig. 5)
using a buffer of size 2 for each variable. To ensure soundness despite this limitation, it
adds assertions to check whether this buffer bound is exceeded.
The lower part of Fig. 5 gives an excerpt of the resulting transformed program
(only the first read of thd1, and the write of thd3). We transform a write into x
(e.g. x:=1 in thd3) with a non-deterministic choice (if(*)): either the write dir-
ectly hits the memory, as it would without transformation, or the write is stored into
the buffer (buff x.push(1,thd3)). We transform a load from x into register r1
(e.g. r1:=x in thd1) with another non-deterministic choice: either a load from the
memory or from the write buffer of x (r1:=buff x.take(thd1)), or a postponed
read (delay r1:=ref(x)).
Postponing a read models the read entering the queue. In this case, we do not update
r1, but the pointer (initially null) delay r1 is set to x (delay r1:=ref(x)where
ref(x) returns the address of x). This pointer 1) states that the value of r1 might
be affected by a delayed read in the queue (as it is not null anymore), and 2) keeps
track of the variable x, which can be read by a read in the queue. When a subsequent
instruction reads the value of r1 (e.g. assert(!(r1 & ...)) in function main)
and delay r1 is null, then we read the current value of r1 because there is no delayed
read in the queue affecting r1. If delay r1 points to a variable x, then there are two
cases (again a non-deterministic choice). Either the flush of the read of x in the queue
happens after the assert, in which case assert reads the current value of r1. Or
the flush happens before, in which case we update r1 with the current value in memory
of the variable pointed to by delay r1, namely x (via r1:=deref(delay r1),
where deref dereferences the pointer in argument).
The transformed goto-program can be given directly to CImpact or SatAbs. Altern-
atively, we can convert it back into C code, and hand it to any program analyser that can
read C source (e.g. CheckFence, ESBMC, Poirot, Threader). We also wrote a converter
to Blender’s input format, and a C# generator for MMChecker.
5 Experimental Results
We exercised our method and measured its cost using 8 tools. We considered 5 ANSI-
C model checkers: SatAbs, a verifier based on predicate abstraction, using Boom as
the model checker for the Boolean program; ESBMC, a bounded model checker; CIm-
pact, a variant of the Impact algorithm extended to SC concurrency; Threader, a thread-
modular verifier; and Poirot, which implements a context-bounded translation to se-
quential programs. These tools cover a broad spectrum of symbolic algorithms for veri-
fying SC programs. We also experimented with Blender, CheckFence, and MMChecker.
We ran our experiments on Linux 2.6.32 64-bit machines with 3.07 GHz (only Poirot
was run on a Windows system).
Validation First, we systematically validate our setup using 555 litmus tests expos-
ing weak memory artefacts (e.g. instruction reordering, store buffering, write atomicity
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Figure 6. Selected experimental results
relaxation) in isolation. The diy tool automatically generates x86, Power and ARM as-
sembly programs implementing an idiom that cannot be reached on SC, but can be
reached on a given model. For example, the sb test of Fig. 1 exhibits store buffering,
thus can be reached on any weak model, from TSO to Power. The iriw test of Fig. 2 can
only be reached on RMO (by reordering the reads) or on Power (for the same reason,
or because the writes are non-atomic). Finally, iriw+dps (i.e. iriw with dependencies
between the reads to prevent their reordering) can only be reached on Power.
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Figure 7. Comparison of tools on all tests and models
Each litmus test comes with an
assertion expressing the SC viola-
tion exercised by the test, e.g. the
outcomes of Fig. 1 and 2. Thus,
verifying a litmus test amounts to
checking whether the model under
scrutiny can reach the specified out-
come. We then convert these tests
automatically into C code, leading
to programs of 48 lines on average,
involving 2 to 4 threads.
These examples allow us to check that we soundly implement the theory of Sec. 3:
we verify each test w.r.t. SC, i.e. no transformation, then w.r.t. TSO, PSO, RMO, and
Power. Despite the tests being small, they provide challenging concurrent idioms to
verify. Fig. 7 compares the tools on all tests and models. Most tools, with the exception
of Blender and SatAbs, timeout or give wrong results on a vast majority of tests.
Fig. 6(a) gives the average time that SatAbs needs to verify several litmus families
(e.g. rfe tests exercise store atomicity, podwr tests exercise the write-read reordering),
for all tools and models, from SC to Power. We also compare the full (Sec. 3.1) and op-
timised transformation (Sec. 3.2) for all models, tools and tests. Thus each run consists
of 9×555 distinct instances. Fig. 6(b) shows that the optimised approach allows SatAbs
to verify 533 of the 555 tests, and 440 with the full approach, in more than twice the
time needed for SC. We give the results for all experiments online.
We also verified several TSO examples (details are online). Note that these examples
in fact only exhibit idioms already covered by our litmus tests (e.g. Dekker corresponds
to the sb test of Fig. 1). We now study a real-life example, an excerpt of the relational
database software PostgreSQL.
Worker Synchronization in PostgreSQL Mid 2011, PostgreSQL developers observed
that a regression test occasionally failed on a multi-core PowerPC system.1 The test
implements a protocol passing a token in a ring of processes. Further analysis drew
the attention to an interprocess signalling mechanism. It turned out that the code had
already been subject to an inconclusive discussion in late 2010.2
1 #define WORKERS 2
2 volatile Bool latch [WORKERS];
3 volatile Bool flag [WORKERS];
4 void worker( int i )
5{ while(! latch [ i ]);
6 for (;;)
7 { assert (! latch [ i ] || flag [ i ]);
8 latch [ i ] = 0;
9 if ( flag [ i ])
10 { flag [ i ] = 0;
11 flag [( i+1)%WORKERS] = 1;
12 latch [( i+1)%WORKERS] = 1; }
13 while(! latch [ i ]); } }
Listing 1.1. C source code of token
passing
The code in Listing 1.1 is an inlined ver-
sion of the problematic code, with an additional
assertion in line 7. Each element of the array
“ latch ” is a Boolean variable stored in shared
memory to facilitate interprocess communica-
tion. Each working process waits to have its
latch set and then expects to have work to do
(from line 9 onwards). Here, the work consists
of passing around a token via the array “ flag ”.
Once the process is done with its work, it passes
the token on (line 11), and sets the latch of the
process the token was passed to (line 12).
Starvation seemingly cannot occur: when a
process is woken up, it has work to do (has
the token). Yet, the PostgreSQL developers ob-
served that the wait in line 13 (which in the original code is bounded in time) would
time out, thus signalling starvation of the ring of processes. Manual inspection iden-
tified the memory model of the platform as possible culprit: it was assumed that the
processor would at times delay the write in line 11 until after the latch had been set.
We transform the code of Listing 1.1 for two workers under Power. The goto-
instrument graph shows two idioms: lb (load buffering) and mp (message passing),
in Fig. 8 and 9, specifying the corresponding lines of Listing 1.1.
The lb idiom contains the two if statements controlling the access to both critical
sections. Since the lb idiom is yet unimplemented by Power machines, (despite being
allowed by the architecture [28]), we believe that this is not the bug observed by the
PostgreSQL developers. Yet, it might lead to actual bugs on future machines.
By contrast, the mp case is commonly observed on Power machines (e.g. 1.7G/167G
on Power 7 [28]). The mp case arises in the PostgreSQL code by the combination of
some writes in the critical section of the first worker, and the access to the critical sec-
tion of the second worker, which lines we give in Fig. 9.
1 http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2011-08/msg00330.php
2 http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2010-11/msg01575.php
pgsql (lb)
Worker 0 Worker 1
(0 : 12) if(flag[0]) (1 : 12)if(flag[1])
(0 : 15) flag[1]=1; (1 : 15)flag[0]=1;
Observed! flag[0]=1; flag[1]=1
R flag[0]
W flag[1]
R flag[1]
W flag[0]
po
rf
po
rf
Figure 8. An lb idiom detected in pgsql.c
pgsql (mp)
Worker 0 Worker 1
(0 : 15) flag[1]=1; (1 : 7)while(!latch[1]);
(0 : 16) latch[1]=1; (1 : 12)if(flag[1])
Observed! latch[1]=1; flag[1]=0
W flag[1]
W latch[1]
R latch[1]
R flag[0]
po
rf
po
fr
Figure 9. An mp idiom detected in pgsql.c
We first check the fully transformed code with SatAbs. After 21.34 seconds, SatAbs
provides a counterexample (given online), where we first execute the first worker up to
the line 17. All accesses are w.r.t. memory, except at lines 14 and 15, where the values
0 and 1 are stored into the buffers of flag[0] and flag[1]. Then the second worker starts,
reading the updated value 1 of latch[1]. It exits the blocking while (line 7) and reaches
the assertion. Here, latch[1] still holds 1, and flag[1] still holds 0, as Worker 0 has not
flushed yet the write waiting in its buffer. Thus, the condition of the if is not true, the
critical section is skipped, and the program arrives line 19, without having authorised
the next worker to enter in critical section, and loops forever.
As mp can arise on Power e.g. because of non-atomic writes, we know by Thm. 2
that we only need to transform one rfe pair of the cycle, and relaunch the verification.
SatAbs spends 1.29 second to check it (and finds a counterexample, as previously).
PostgreSQL developers had discussed ways of fixing this, but only committed com-
ments to the code base as it remained unclear whether the intended fixes were appro-
priate. We proposed a provably correct patch solving both lb and mp. After discussion
with the developers3, we improved it to meet the developers’ desire to maintain the cur-
rent API. The final patch places two lwsync barriers: after line 8 and before line 12.
6 Conclusion
We presented a provably sound method to verify concurrent software w.r.t. weak memory.
Our contribution allows to lift SC methods and tools to a wide range of weak memory
models (from x86 to Power), by the mean of program transformation.
Our approach crucially relies on the definition of a generic operational model equi-
valent to the axiomatic one of [5]. We do not favor any style of model in particular, but
we highlight the importance of having several equivalent mathematic styles to describe
a field as intricate as weak memory. In addition, operational models are often the style
of choice in the verification community; we contribute here to the vocabular to tackle
the verification problem w.r.t. weak memory.
Our extensive experiments and in particular the PostgreSQL bug demonstrate the
practicability of our approach from several different perspectives. First, we confirmed
3 http://archives.postgresql.org/pgsql-hackers/2012-03/msg01506.php
an existing bug (mp), and validated the fix proposed by the developers, including eval-
uation of different synchronisation options. Second, we found an additional idiom (lb),
which will be a bug on future Power machines; our fix repairs it already. Third, our
work raised notable interest in both the open-source world (see our discussion with
the PostgreSQL developers) and in industry (our nascent collaboration with IBM). The
verification problem under weak memory is far from being solved (in particular for
scalability reasons, as shown by our experiments) but we made a convincing first step.
References
1. http:/research.microsoft.com/en-us/projects/poirot.
2. P. Abdulla, M. F. Atig, Y. Chen, C. Leonardsson, and A. Rezine. Counter-Example Guided
Fence Insertion under TSO. In TACAS 2012.
3. S. V. Adve and K. Gharachorloo. Shared Memory Consistency Models: A Tutorial. IEEE
Computer, 29:66–76, 1995.
4. J. Alglave and L. Maranget. Stability in Weak Memory Models. In CAV 2011.
5. J. Alglave, L. Maranget, S. Sarkar, and P. Sewell. Fences in Weak Memory Models. In
CAV 2010.
6. M. F. Atig, A. Bouajjani, S. Burckhardt, and M. Musuvathi. On the verification problem for
weak memory models. In POPL 2010.
7. M. F. Atig, A. Bouajjani, S. Burckhardt, and M. Musuvathi. What’s decidable about weak
memory models? In ESOP 2012.
8. M. F. Atig, A. Bouajjani, and G. Parlato. Getting Rid of Store-Buffers in the Analysis of
Weak Memory Models. In CAV 2011.
9. S. Burckhardt, R. Alur, and M. K. Martin. Checkfence: Checking consistency of concurrent
data types on relaxed memory models. In PLDI 2007.
10. S. Burckhardt and M. Musuvathi. Effective Program Verification for Relaxed Memory Mod-
els. In CAV 2008.
11. L. Cordeiro and B. Fischer. Verifying multi-threaded software using SMT-based context-
bounded model checking. In ICSE, pages 331–340. ACM, 2011.
12. E. W. Dijkstra. Cooperating sequential processes. 1965.
13. A. Donaldson, A. Kaiser, D. Kroening, and T. Wahl. Symmetry-aware predicate abstraction
for shared-variable concurrent programs. In CAV, 2011.
14. A. Gupta, C. Popeea, and A. Rybalchenko. Threader: A constraint-based verifier for multi-
threaded programs. In CAV 2011.
15. T. Huynh and A. Roychoudhury. A memory model sensitive checker for C#. In FM 2006.
16. H. Jin, T. Yavuz-Kahveci, and B. A. Sanders. Java memory model-aware model checking.
In TACAS 2012.
17. M. Kuperstein, M. Vechev, and E. Yahav. Automatic inference of memory fences. In FM-
CAD 10.
18. M. Kuperstein, M. Vechev, and E. Yahav. Partial-Coherence Abstractions for Relaxed
Memory Models. In PLDI 2011.
19. L. Lamport. A fast mutual exclusion algorithm.
20. L. Lamport. How to Make a Correct Multiprocess Program Execute Correctly on a Multi-
processor. IEEE Trans. Comput., 46(7):779–782, 1979.
21. A. Linden and P.Wolper. A verification-based approach to memory fence insertion in relaxed
memory systems. In SPIN 2011.
22. K. L. McMillan. Lazy abstraction with interpolants. In CAV, 2006.
23. S. Owens. Reasoning about the Implementation of Concurrency Abstractions on x86-TSO.
In ECOOP 2010.
24. S. Owens, S. Sarkar, and P. Sewell. A better x86 memory model: x86-TSO. In TPHOL 09.
25. S. Park and D. Dill. An executable specification, analyzer and verifier for RMO. In SPAA 95.
26. G. L. Peterson. Myths about the mutual exclusion problem.
27. M. Rinard. Analysis of Multithreaded Programs. In SAS 2001.
28. S. Sarkar, P. Sewell, J. Alglave, L. Maranget, and D. Williams. Understanding Power Multi-
processors. In PLDI 2011.
29. D. Shasha and M. Snir. Efficient and correct execution of parallel programs that share
memory. In TOPLAS 1988.
30. B. K. Szymanski. A simple solution to Lamport’s concurrent programming problem with
linear wait.
31. Y. Yang, G. Gopalakrishnan, and G. Lindstrom. Memory model sensitive data race analysis.
In ICFEM 2004.
